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Subsidiaries of multinational enterprises (MNEs) are vulnerable to cyber-attacks because they operate in 
diverse environments that are different from the contexts in the home countries. After they get legitimacy 
in the host countries, subsidiaries not only receive isomorphic pressure, but also gain protection from the 
local institutional environments, specifically legal protection. In recent years, information security 
breaches perpetrated by insiders become more common among MNEs. Directed by the General 
Deterrence Theory, this paper explores whether the legal protection in host-countries deters employees’ 
information leaking behavior in MNE subsidiaries. In particular, this paper proposes that the rule of law 
and the efficiency of the judicial system in a host-country negatively influence MNE subsidiaries’ 
employees’ information leaking behaviors. In terms of law original, this paper proposes that MNE 
subsidiaries located in common-law countries experience fewer information security breaches than those 
located in civil-law countries. In addition, this paper argues that the level of income in a host-country is 
negatively related with the amount of information security breaches that MNE subsidiaries experience. 
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Introduction 
Information systems have been adopted widely by multinational enterprises (MNEs) to enhance business 
operations, to facilitate management decision-making, and to deploy business strategies (Kankanhalli, 
Teo, Tan, & Wei, 2003). As a increasing variety of transactions involving the trading of goods and services 
are accomplished electronically, abundant opportunities for unauthorized access to IS are presented as 
well (Brooks, Warren, & Hutchinson, 2002; Gupta & Hammond, 2005). For MNEs, the prevalence of 
offshore outsourcing and other managed data services has introduced significant information security 
problems (Hovav & D’Arcy, 2012). In a 2006 survey that examined the privacy policies of 47 U.S. and E.U. 
multinational companies, 94 percent of the E.U. companies reported that they had experienced an 
information security breach (ISB) during the past three years, compared with 86 percent of their 
American counterparts (Cline, 2006). ISBs are big threats for MNEs because such intrusions increase 
their expenses, decrease their profits and dividends, drop their stock prices, damage customer confidence, 
and reduce market values (Power, 2003). Once ISBs occur, huge number of customers can be affected. 
For example, in 2011, Sony experienced an ISB that led to a leak of 77-million users’ account information 
(Reuters, 2011). Moreover, ISBs could cause tremendous financial losses as well. The average cost of an 
ISB for a U.S. corporation during the first quarter of 2012 was estimated to be $4,688,139 (Visser, Hardin, 
Drage, Pinne, & Drage, 2012).  
According to Symantec (2012), although the main threats for IS systems are from malicious outsiders 
(hackers), insider threats caused by employees’ intentional and unintentional leaking or stealing of 
valuable data have been increasing in recent years. MNEs have spent millions of dollars on technology to 
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prevent outside attacks. Their technology, however, has not able to prevent insiders from disabling it or 
doing unintentional damage (VanCura, 2005). The most frequent cause of ISBs was theft or loss of 
computers or memory sticks on which data is stored or transmitted (Symantec, 2012). Meanwhile, 
another survey from Computer Security Institute (2011) indicates that nearly half of significant security 
breaches are perpetrated by malicious and/or non-malicious insiders.  
As ISB reports have continued to rise in recent years (Richardson, 2009), information security attracts 
continued attention from practitioners and scholars. The ISB literature has been focused on deterrence 
(Hovav & D’Arcy 2012; Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan, & Wei, 2003), information security policy enforcement 
(Yayla, 2011), top management support (Knapp, Marshall, Rainer, & Ford, 2006), security breach notices 
(Cate, 2008), and trust (Al-Awadi & Renaud, 2007; Dols & Silvius, 2010). ISBs occur when information 
system security measures are not effective and unauthorized persons take advantage of that 
ineffectiveness. The effectiveness of information system security measures depends on the kind of 
deterrence that can dissuade potential abusers from criminal behavior through fear of sanctions (Forcht, 
1994). Williams and Hawkins (1986) point out that sanctions are effective when people feel that they will 
definitely be punished for what they did and know that the punishment will be harsh. Therefore, 
deterrence relies on the certainty of sanctions and the severity of sanctions (Blumstein, 1978). 
 When MNEs span multiple continents, their subsidiaries face specific challenges in maintaining their 
information security because they operate in diverse environments that are different from the contexts 
within their home countries. For them, deterrence about information security on their employee, at the 
country level, mainly stems from the overall development of the jurisdiction’s legal systems in the host 
countries and the effectiveness of their judiciaries, more specifically (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 
2009; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2003). In other words, MNE subsidiaries’ 
information security relies on protection from the formal institutions (North, 1990) or the regulative pillar 
(Scott, 2001) in the host countries. Therefore, host countries’ institutional environments, specifically the 
legal aspects of those institutional environments, should not be ignored when studying MNE subsidiaries’ 
information security.  
Prior research has explored the impacts of host countries’ institutional factors on MNE across border 
expansions, such as joint venture partner selection (Roy & Oliver, 2009), entry mode (Brouthers, 2002; 
Delios & Henisz, 2003), investments in host countries (Globerman & Shapior, 2003; Holburn & Zelner, 
2010), and subsidiaries’ human resource management practices (Björkman, Fey, & Park, 2007).  The 
focus of prior research is how MNEs gain legitimacy in host countries by adapting their strategies and 
operations to the local institutional environments. However, it is not noted that that MNE subsidiaries 
receive protection from local legal systems, once their legitimacy is determined. In terms of information 
security, MNE subsidiaries benefit from the deterrence generated by the legal systems in their host 
countries. Although Yayla (2011) argues that high institutional distance between a parent company and its 
subsidiaries has a negative effect on the process of enforcing information security policies to the 
subsidiary, the question that remains unanswered is: How do host-country legal environments influence 
MNE subsidiaries’ information security? This paper aims to explore this question and to make 
contributions to improving information security for MNE subsidiaries. 
This paper predicts that a host country’s legal environment, its rule of law, and the efficiency of its judicial 
system will negatively influence MNE subsidiaries’ information security, and in particular will influence 
the number of their ISBs. It theorizes that the host countries’ legal environments are a factor in MNE 
subsidiaries’ ISBs because they provide the rules of the game within which employees in MNE 
subsidiaries follow the information security regulations and generate deterrence that dissuades employees 
from abusing information. In addition, this paper argues that the extent of ISBs experienced by MNE 
subsidiaries is impacted by the host countries’ origin of law and level of income. The contribution of this 
paper is that it applies institutional theory to MNE subsidiaries’ information security, thereby providing 
information security literature with novel underpinnings.  
Literature Review 
Information Security Breach 
An information system is “any combination of information technology and people's activities using that 
technology to support operations, management, and decision-making” (Ellison & Moore, 2003:67). To 
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enhance their business operations and to add to their strategic advantages, MNEs have become 
increasingly dependent on information systems. As the business environment becomes more 
electronically interconnected, information security concerns become paramount (Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan, 
& Wei, 2003). When handling information, MNEs need to identify and minimize risks in order to preserve 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their information (Pelaez, 2010). An information security 
breach (ISB) is defined by most breach laws as “unauthorized access to defined categories of personal 
information” (Cate, 2008:4). An ISB can result from “loss or theft of data or equipment on which data is 
stored”, “equipment failure”, “human error”, or even “unforeseen circumstances such as a fire or flood.” 
(Information Commissioner’s Office, 2008). According to Cate (2008), ISBs occur not only when specific 
information has been accessed without authorization, but also when such information is lost or stolen, 
even though it has not been accessed. Information system security handles “the prevention, detection and 
response to adversaries’ attacks, and recovery from successful attacks.”  It involves “procedural and 
administrative processes that are implemented in order to protect information systems” (Chaula, 
2006:17). 
For MNEs, an ISB usually entails huge financial penalties, expensive lawsuits, and loss of reputation and 
businesses (Mishra, 2011). The extent of ISBs indicates how severe the results caused by them can be. The 
extent of an ISB is usually measured by the types of data that are exposed, the financial losses, and the 
total number of ISBs during a specific period (Computer Security Institute, 2011; Visser, Hardin, Drage, 
Pinne, & Drage, 2012). Very often, customers’ personal information (e.g., name, social security number, 
phone number, email, and medical record) and/or financial information (e.g., credit card number) are 
exposed when ISBs occur (Visser, Hardin, Drage, Pinne, & Drage, 2012). The data types mentioned above 
can somehow indicate the range of the effect caused by ISBs.  When calculating financial losses, both 
direct losses and indirect losses are calculated. The former, which includes the cost of responding to the 
incident, hiring investigators, and sending out notification letters etc., is easy to calculate, whereas the 
latter, which includes the losses of customers, future business, and capital etc., is harder to measure 
(Computer Security Institute, 2011). The combination of these three measurements, namely data types, 
financial losses, and total number of ISBs, might be an effective method to gauge the extent of MNEs’ ISBs 
during a given time period.  
ISBs occur when information system security measures are not effective and unauthorized persons take 
advantage of that ineffectiveness. Information system security effectiveness is the ability of information 
system security measures to protect against the unauthorized and deliberate misuse of the assets of the 
local organizational information system by individuals, including violations against hardware, programs, 
data, and computer service (Straub & Welke, 1998). Factors such as information security policies, 
industry type, top management support, firm size, deterrent efforts, and preventive measures, affect 
information system security effectiveness (Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan, & Wei, 
2003).  
Identifying where information abusers come from is critical for improving information system security 
effectiveness, specifically for MNE subsidiaries, which often spread around the world. According to the 
Computer Security Institute (2011), nearly half of significant ISBs are perpetrated by malicious and/or 
non-malicious insiders. McAfee (2005) reveals that company insiders mainly misuse information by: (1) 
allowing family and friends to use company laptops and personal computers for internet access; (2) 
connecting personal devices to company computers; (3) Storing personal content on company computers; 
and (4) downloading prohibited content at work. Many technological and/or policy measures targeting at 
insiders can be taken to improve MNE subsidiaries’ information security. This paper, however, focuses on 
exploring how deterrence from legal systems at the country level in host countries affects MNE 
subsidiaries’ information system security effectiveness. 
Deterrence and Formal Institutions 
General deterrence theory (GDT), a theory used in criminal justice, has been adopted by information 
system security scholars to explain how security countermeasures can increase the perceptions of 
members in an organization regarding the severity and certainty of punishment for any misuse of 
information (Straub, 1990). GDT is grounded in the assumption that potential criminals are rational 
actors. Carlsmith, Darley, and Robinson (2002) argue that deterrence makes criminal activities 
unattractive by changing the costs and benefits of a situation. Bentham (1962) notes that “if the apparent 
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magnitude, or rather value of [the] pain be greater than the apparent magnitude or value of the pleasure 
or good he expects to be the consequence of the act, he will be absolutely prevented from performing it” 
(p. 396). According to GDT, deterrent measures can dissuade people from performing certain behaviors 
through fear of sanctions (Forcht, 1994). Usually, deterrent measures take the form of policies, 
regulations, or briefings. Valid deterrent measures can make potential violators realize the certainty of 
sanctions and the severity of sanctions (Blumstein, 1978). Thus, effective deterrent measures are the 
premise of deterrence. Straub (1990) notes that deterrent measures for information security include 
policy statements and guidelines on the legitimate use of IS assets, security briefings on the consequences 
of the illegitimate use of IS assets, and audits on the use of IS assets. Their main goal is to convince 
outsiders and insiders who plan to perpetrate ISBs that the probability of getting caught is high and that 
the punishment is severe.  Previous research has proven that deterrence can prevent information abuses 
to some extent (Straub, 1990). 
At the country level, deterrence stems from laws, regulations, and rules, which are formal institutions 
created and enforced by a country to sanction individual or corporate actions through attaching rewards 
or punishments to alternative courses of behavior (Goodin, 1996). Formal institutions, together with 
informal institutions such as norms, cultures, and ethics, act as the “rules of the game” in a society (North, 
1990). The country-level institutional factors define what is socially or legally appropriate in institutional 
settings (Scott, 2001) and condition firm strategies, practices, and their outcomes (van Essen, Heugens, 
Otten, & van Oosterhout, 2012). The institutional context of a host country is a key factor that influences 
MNEs’ decisions and behaviors. Prior research has demonstrated the power of the host-country’s 
institutional environment in shaping how MNEs choose an entry mode (Brouthers, 2002; Delios & 
Henisz, 2003), perform human resource management (Bjorkman, Fey, & Park, 2007), and select 
international joint venture partners (Roy & Oliver, 2009).  
It is well recognized that MNE subsidiaries located in host countries are influenced by potentially 
contradictory pulls from the institutional factors in their local environments (Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991; 
Westney, 1993; Bjorkman, Fey, & Park, 2007). In a host-country institutional environment, formal 
institutions provide an incentive structure within which “firms rationally pursue their interests and make 
choices” (Peng & Khoury, 2008:260). The constraints and forces in the local environment converge and 
create isomorphisms, specifically coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and normative 
isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). When MNEs span multiple continents, their subsidiaries 
attempt to acquire legitimacy and recognition by adopting those structures and practices that are viewed 
as appropriate within their local environments (Bjorkman, Fey, & Park, 2007). Coercive isomorphism 
coming from the rule of law and the efficiency of the judicial system in a host country forces MNE 
subsidiaries to adapt their strategies accordingly for survival and success (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Roy 
& Oliver, 2009). Meanwhile, it should not be ignored that when they follow the isomorphic pressure in 
their local environments, MNE subsidiaries benefit from their local legitimacy as well. Once they achieve 
legitimacy in a host country, they begin to receive protection from the local legal system. On one hand, the 
deterrence generated by local legal systems can prevent potential information abuses on MNE 
subsidiaries. On the other hand, information abusers will be caught and punished. 
In their analysis of the laws in 49 countries, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) found 
that laws and the quality of law enforcement vary across the globe. They also found that the origin of law 
and the gross national product (GNP) per capita level in a country can affect the protection of laws. 
Regarding information security protection, the quality of legal rules and the process by which a judicial 
system handles information abusers impact the effectiveness of deterrence on information security. As 
such, this paper predicts that the formal institutions, specifically the legal environments, in host countries 
will affect MNE subsidiaries’ IS security, since better institutional safeguards can prevent IS security 
breaches.  
Theory and Propositions 
Deterrence stemming from the laws, regulations, and rules in their host countries plays a key role in 
preventing information abuses in MNE subsidiaries. At the country level, the effects of deterrence depend 
on rule of law and the efficiency of judicial system (Djankov et al., 2003; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 
2009). A novel conceptual model has been developed to explain how the legal environment in host 
countries, the rule of law, the efficiency of judicial system, and the origin of law more specifically, as well 
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as the level of income, may influence MNE subsidiaries’ information security. Each of the model’s 
components and relationships is illustrated in Figure 1 and each is discussed below. 
 
Figure 1. Host country legal environment and MNE subsidiaries information security 
breaches 
 
Rule of Law  
Rule of law is “a system in which the laws are public knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally to 
everyone” (Carothers, 1998:96). It refers to “the success of a society in creating an environment in which 
fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions, and, importantly, the extent 
to which property rights are enforced” (Cuervo-Cazurra & Mehmet Genc, 2008: 965). Rule of law requires 
that “laws must be open, clear, coherent, prospective, and stable, that “legislation and executive action 
should be governed by laws with those characteristics”, and that “there must be courts that impose the 
rule of law” (Endicott, 1999:1). It aims to protect legal entitlements, including ownership in tangible and 
intangible property and personal safety (Licht, Goldschmidt, & Schwartz, 2007). It is a safeguard against 
arbitrary rulings in individual cases and determines the probability that those who commit crimes will be 
apprehended (Becker, 1968).  
 
Rule of law varies considerably across countries. In those countries whose legal systems consist of voids, 
laws are ambiguous, incomplete, and contradictory (Li & Filer, 2007; Park & Luo, 2001). In addition, laws 
and regulations in emerging countries are usually not precisely codified (Boisot & Child, 1996; Peng 
&Zhou, 2005) and they tend to be complex and unstable (Doh & Pearce, 2004; Peng & Zhou, 2005). 
These characteristics damage the rule of law in these countries. Strong rule of law provides clear 
guidelines for individuals about which behaviors are allowed and which are not. By maintaining law and 
order well and by punishing crimes, a strong rule of law can generate an effective deterrence. By contrast, 
a legal environment with a weak rule of law is ambiguous, contested, and riddled with loopholes (Scholz, 
1984). The lack of clear guidelines can make individuals feel confused about their behaviors. In this case, 
the effectiveness of the deterrence is in question due to lacking premise. 
 
Since it is an intangible property, information relies on laws for protection. A strong rule of law regarding 
information security in a host country can generate effective deterrence, which can protect MNE 
subsidiaries from suffering ISBs. Deterrence works during the process when potential information 
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abusers calculate the costs and benefits of their actions. When clear guidelines are available, potential 
information abusers (insiders in this case) can clearly compare the costs and benefits before abusing any 
information. On the contrary, a weak rule of law cannot generate such strong deterrence to prevent ISBs. 
Consequently, this paper conjectures a negative relationship between the rule of law in a host country and 
the number of the country’s MNE subsidiaries’ ISBs.  This leads to the following proposition: 
  
Proposition 1. The rule of law in a host country negatively influences the extent of the information 
security breaches that multinational enterprise subsidiaries operating in this country experience. 
 
Efficiency of Judicial System  
Laws do not have any effect if they merely stay on the books. In order to have an effect, they must be 
applied by their judicial systems. Laws vary across countries; different countries enforce laws to differing 
extents, depending on the efficiency and honesty of their judiciaries (Jappelli, Pagano, & Binco, 2005). 
Judicial systems that lack properly developed court systems, arbitration institutions, and legal 
consultancies are not efficient (Delios & Henisz, 2000; Peng & Heath, 1996). A transparent and efficient 
court system is likely to provide better protection in information security, whereas poor judicial 
enforcement will increase opportunistic behavior, and it can be anticipated that information abuses will 
be more likely to happen (Jappelli, Pagano, & Binco, 2005). Luo (2007) also argues that perception of law 
unenforceability in a country increases the incidence of opportunistic behavior. When opportunistic 
behaviors are not punished, the effect of any deterrence is in question. As Williams and Hawkins (1986) 
point out, deterrence occurs when individuals realize that they will definitely be punished for what they 
did and that the punishment will be harsh. 
 
In term of information security, a highly efficient judicial system ensures that information abusers will be 
punished and that the the punishment will be harsh. Effective deterrence is generated in this way because 
possible perpetrators will be dissuaded from opportunistic behaviors. Potential information abusers will 
have to consider the costs before they abuse information. In contrast, a less efficient judicial system 
cannot guarantee that information abusers will get harsh punishments. As a result, deterrence will not be 
strong enough to dissuade opportunistic behaviors regarding information security. Therefore, this paper 
posits a negative relationship between the efficiency of the judicial system in a host country and the 
number of its MNE subsidiaries’ ISBs.  This leads to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2. The efficiency of the judicial system in a host country negatively influences the extent of 




Although laws vary a lot across the world, they mainly come from two broad traditions: common law and 
civil law (La Porta et al., 1998). La Porta et al. (1998) note that common law originates in English law, 
which allows judges to resolve specific disputes, whereas civil law derives from Roman law and uses 
statutes and comprehensive codes as a primary means of ordering legal material. Civil law relies heavily 
on legal scholars to ascertain and formulate its rules (Merryman, 1969). La Porta et al. (1998) argue that 
common-law countries give shareholders and creditors stronger protection than civil-law countries do. As 
such, this paper posits that MNE subsidiaries operating in common-law countries are afforded stronger 
protection than those in civil-law countries. This leads to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3. Multinational enterprise subsidiaries operating in common-law countries have fewer 
information security breaches than those operating in civil-law countries. 
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Level of Income as a Moderator 
It is generally thought that strong law enforcement can compensate for the quality of laws in countries 
with poor laws. But La Porta et al. (1998) argue that the quality of laws cannot be substituted for or 
compensated for in this way. They point out that the quality of law enforcement improves sharply with the 
level of income. They argue that the level of per capita income of a country has an important confounding 
effect on law enforcement. They further argue that richer countries have higher quality law enforcement, 
and that the quality of law enforcement is the highest in the Scandinavian and German-civil-law countries 
and the lowest in the French-civil-law countries. A high quality of law enforcement allows countries to 
fight crimes more effectively and generates better deterrence than a low quality one.  Given the impact of 
the level of income on the quality of law enforcement, this paper conjectures that MNE subsidiaries 
operating in countries with a high level of income experience fewer ISBs than those in countries with a 
low level of income. This leads to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 4.  All other things being equal, MNE subsidiaries experience fewer information security 
breaches in host countries with higher levels of income. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
MNEs must take into account the institutional factors in host countries when they span their business 
across continents. The isomorphic pressure coming from the local institutional environment pushes the 
subsidiaries to get legitimacy in host countries. However, it should not be overlooked that once MNE 
subsidiaries achieve legitimacy in host countries, they are covered by the protection of the local 
institutional environment, especially the legal environment. This protection is vital for MNE subsidiaries’ 
information security because the number of ISBs perpetrated by insiders has been increasing in recent 
years. Deterrence stemming from the rule of law and the judicial system in local legal environment can 
stop information abuses by indicating to potential information abusers the costs and benefits of their 
behaviors. Just as laws and law enforcement vary across countries, differences in the effect of deterrence 
exist among countries. Therefore, this paper argues that the effect of deterrence is negatively related with 
the number of the MNE subsidiaries’ ISBs. More specifically, the rule of law and the efficiency of the 
judicial system in a host country negatively influence the number of MNE subsidiaries’ ISBs. 
Furthermore, this paper argues that the origin of law and the level of income in a host country impact the 
number of MNE subsidiaries’ information security breaches. This paper extends the research of the 
impact of the host country’s institutional factors on MNE subsidiaries by taking considering the 
protection that MNE subsidiaries receive from local legal environments, once their legitimacy is 
established. This paper offers MNE managers an institutional perspective, considering the legal 
environment more specifically, about how to minimize ISBs and improve information security. Managers 
in MNE subsidiaries can take advantage of the protection from their local legal environments and can 
improve their information security effectiveness. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned contributions, this paper has the following limitations. First, although 
recent data show that information security threats from insiders have been increasing and remain high, 
threats from outsiders still exist and account for some proportion of ISBs. For MNE subsidiaries, potential 
outside hackers are not limited to placement within the borders of host countries because of the wide 
spread of electronic transactions, based on the Internet. Deterrence generated by the laws one of a 
country works on insider breachers, but those laws do not span across borders. Future research needs to 
explore how local legal environments in host countries can impact the number of ISBs committed by 
outsiders. Second, Phillips and Votey (1972) point out that deterrence stems from resources, such as the 
law enforcement system, the judicial system, and the correction system. This paper takes into account the 
judicial system and law enforcement, but neglects the correction system. Future studies on how the 
correction system in a host country impacts deterrence and further influences MNE subsidiaries’ 
information security are needed. 
 
A challenge for future studies is to get ISB data. Companies are extremely unwilling to admit when they 
have an ISB, simply because they do not want consumers to lose faith in them. This desire to keep 
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problems secret makes it very hard for researchers to collect data about the frequency and the number of 
losses due to breaches in information security (Barker, 2003).  
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